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Through July 2009, a total of 43,677 laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed cases of inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 were 
reported in the United States, which is likely a substantial 
underestimate of the true number. Correcting for under-as-
certainment using a multiplier model, we estimate that 1.8 
million–5.7 million cases occurred, including 9,000–21,000 
hospitalizations.
H
uman cases of inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
were ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed in the United States in April 2009 
(1,2). By the end of July, >40,000 laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
infections had been reported, representing only a fraction 
of total cases. Persons with inﬂ  uenza may not be included 
in reported counts for a variety of reasons, including the 
following: not all ill persons seek medical care and have a 
specimen collected, not all specimens are sent to a public 
health laboratory for conﬁ  rmatory testing with reverse tran-
scription–PCR (RT-PCR; rapid point-of-care testing cannot 
differentiate pandemic [H1N1] 2009 from other strains), 
and not all specimens will give positive results because of 
the timing of collection or the quality of the specimen. To 
better estimate the prevalence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
during April–July 2009 in the United States, we created a 
simple multiplier model that adjusts for these sources of 
under-ascertainment.
The Study
Through July 23, 2009, a total of 43,677 laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed infections with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 had been 
reported in the United States by the 50 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, including 5,009 hospitalizations and 302 
deaths. To estimate the total number of cases of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, we built a probabilistic multiplier model that 
adjusts the count of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases for each 
of the following steps: medical care seeking (A), speci-
men collection (B), submission of specimens for conﬁ  rma-
tion (C), laboratory detection of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(D), and reporting of conﬁ  rmed cases (E) (Figure). This 
approach has been used to calculate the underrecognized 
impact of foodborne illness in the United States (3).
At each step, we identiﬁ  ed a range of proportions ob-
served in prior published studies and recent surveys and 
investigations of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. These include 
2 unpublished community surveys on inﬂ  uenza-like ill-
ness (ILI) and health-seeking behavior, the 2007 Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey conducted in 10 
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Figure. Schematic of the steps involved in adjusting counts of 
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states and repeated in the same states during May 2009, 
and ﬁ  eld investigations conducted during early outbreaks 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Chicago and Delaware (on-
line Technical Appendix, available from www.cdc.gov/
EID/content/15/12/2004-Techapp.pdf; [4]). We theorized 
that, given recommendations for testing, patients hospital-
ized with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 would more likely have 
been tested and their cases reported than would outpatients. 
We therefore stratiﬁ  ed our model between hospitalized and 
nonhospitalized cases (Figure). For hospitalized patients, 
we used larger estimates of the proportion of specimens 
collected, tested, and reported, which resulted in smaller 
multiplier values (Table 1). We also adjusted for the fact 
that early in the epidemic physicians and health depart-
ments were encouraged to collect clinical specimens from 
all suspect case-patients with ILI and forward them for con-
ﬁ  rmatory testing with RT-PCR. By May 12, due to the in-
creasing number of cases and the demands on public health 
laboratories, guidance for conﬁ  rmatory testing was revised 
to focus on hospitalized patients. We therefore used a lower 
estimate for the proportion of specimens collected from pa-
tients with mild illness after that date, effectively increas-
ing the multiplier for those patients (Table 1).
Multipliers were calculated as the simple inverses of 
the proportions at each step. We accounted for variability 
and uncertainty in model parameters by using a probabi-
listic (Monte Carlo) approach (built by using SAS version 
9.2; SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA). For each parameter in-
cluded in the model, we used uniform probability distribu-
tions that covered a range of minimum to maximum values, 
from which the model randomly sampled 10,000 iterations 
(online Technical Appendix). We generated median, upper, 
and lower 90% values for the number of total illnesses and 
hospitalizations.
To further divide estimated cases into age groups, we 
applied the age distribution of conﬁ  rmed cases and hospi-
talizations as reported to the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention through July 23, 2009 (online Tech-
nical Appendix), and calculated overall and age-speciﬁ  c 
incidence of illness and hospitalization, based on the US 
Census monthly population estimates for May 2009. We 
did not have age-speciﬁ  c parameter estimates, and thus did 
not stratify by age group within the model. This approach 
may not fully capture differences in the probability of as-
certainment by age.
Using this approach, between April and July 2009, 
we estimate that the median multiplier of reported to es-
timated cases was 79; that is, every reported case of pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 may represent 79 total cases, with a 
90% probability range of 47–148, for a median estimate of 
3.0 million (range 1.8–5.7 million) symptomatic cases of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the United States. Likewise, we 
estimate that every hospitalized case of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 that was reported may represent a median of 2.7 total 
hospitalized persons (90% range 1.9–4.3). This represents 
a median estimate of 14,000 (range 9,000–21,000) hospi-
talizations (Table 2) and thus an estimated ratio of hos-
pitalizations to total symptomatic cases of 0.45% (range 
0.16%–1.2%).
We also estimate that incidence of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 over the ﬁ  rst 4 months of the pandemic in the United 
States ranged from a median of 107/100,000 in persons >65 
years of age, to 2,196/100,000 in persons 5–24 years of age 
(Table 2). The incidence of hospitalization was estimated 
to be highest in young children <5 years of age (median 
13.0/100,000, 90% range 8.8–20.2).
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 12, December 2009  2005 
Table 1. Model parameters and sources of data included in the model estimating prevalence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, United States,
April–July 2009* 
Ranges included in the model, %
Parameter Observed value Source Not hospitalized Hospitalized
42 2007 BRFSS, 9 states†
52–55 2009 ILI survey, 10 states†
49–58 Delaware university survey
A Proportion of persons with influenza 
who seek medical care, %
52 Chicago community survey
42–58 100
25 2007 BRFSS, 9 states†
22–28 2009 ILI survey, 10 states†
B Proportion of persons seeking care 
with a specimen collected, %
19–34 Delaware university survey
19–34 40–75
C Proportion of specimens collected that 
are sent for confirmatory testing, %
26
(through May 3)
Delaware university survey 20–30 (through May 
12); 5–15 (after May 12)
50–90
D Test detects influenza Published studies 90–100 90–100
E Proportion of confirmed cases 
reported to CDC
Assumption 95–100 95–100
No. reported cases 43,677 Reports to CDC through 
July 23, 2009
4,759 (through May 12); 
33,909 (after May 12)
5,009
*BFRSS, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey; ILI, Influenza-like illness; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. States include 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee. 
†Parameter estimates and sources are described in further detail in the online Technical Appendix; available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/15/12/2004-
Techapp.pdf.  Conclusions
We demonstrate that the reported cases of laboratory 
conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 are likely a substantial 
underestimation of the total number of actual illnesses that 
occurred in the community during the spring of 2009. We 
estimate that through July 23, 2009, from 1.8 million to 
5.7 million symptomatic cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
occurred in the United States, resulting in 9,000–21,000 
hospitalizations. We did not estimate the number of deaths 
directly from our model, but among reports of laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed cases though July 23, the ratio of deaths to hos-
pitalizations was 6%. When applying this fraction to the 
number of hospitalizations calculated from the model—that 
is, by assuming that deaths and hospitalizations are under-
reported to the same extent—we obtain a median estimate 
of 800 deaths (90% range 550–1,300) during this same 
period. Because this assumption has several limitations 
(5), more sophisticated models are also being developed 
to better understand the severity of the US epidemic in the 
spring of 2009, including intensive care unit admissions 
and deaths (6). 
Our analysis involves several assumptions. Data for 
parameter estimates were collected in limited periods and 
areas and thus may not be fully representative of the entire 
United States. To account for some of this uncertainty, a 
range of values was included for each proportion. Addi-
tional data from surveys of health-seeking behavior, physi-
cian testing practices, and policies for conﬁ  rmatory testing 
at public health laboratories could help reﬁ  ne the param-
eter estimates. In addition, parameters were obtained from 
studies of persons with ILI, deﬁ  ned as fever with cough or 
sore throat. Persons with milder illness may be less likely 
to seek care or be tested, and thus may not be fully captured 
in these estimates. Likewise, in some heavily affected ar-
eas, the size of the outbreak quickly exceeded the capacity 
to ascertain and test case-patients. Thus, our results may 
reﬂ  ect a conservative estimate of total cases.
As pandemic (H1N1) 2009 continues to spread through 
the United States and the world, laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases 
will continue to greatly underestimate the number of actual 
cases that occur. Surveillance for inﬂ  uenza does not tradi-
tionally rely on complete case ascertainment, which would 
be impractical, but on focused case ascertainment with 
well-characterized surveillance systems and special stud-
ies. Unfortunately, relying on laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases 
limits the ability to understand the full impact and sever-
ity of the epidemic, especially when severe cases are more 
likely to be recognized (5).
This model provides a relatively quick and simple 
approach to estimate the human health impact of the epi-
demic in advance of more rigorous analysis of surveillance 
and health care data that will be available over the next 
few years. Health systems and infrastructure may be un-
prepared in the short-term if plans are based on a number 
of conﬁ  rmed cases that substantially underestimates the 
impact of the epidemic. We estimate that the total num-
ber of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases in the United States 
during April–July 2009 may have been up to 140× greater 
than the reported number of laboratory conﬁ  rmed cases. A 
spreadsheet version of the model has been developed and 
is available online (www.cdc.gov/h1n1ﬂ  u/tools).  Using 
this tool, health ofﬁ  cials and policy makers could adjust 
DISPATCHES
2006  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 12, December 2009
Table 2. Estimates of pandemic (H1N1) 2009–related cases and rates of illness and hospitalization by age distribution of confirmed
case-patients, United States, April–July 2009 
Estimated no. case-patients Estimated rate/100,000*
Parameter Median 90% range Median 90% range
Total no. case-patients by age group, y† 3,052,768 1,831,115–5,720,928 997 598–1,868
 0–4 397,033 238,149–744,045 1,870 1,122–3,505
 5–24 1,820,284 1,091,845–3,411,237 2,196 1,317–4,115
 25–49 612,862 367,608–1,148,511 577 346–1,081
 50–64 180,297 108,146–337,879 319 192–599
>65 42,292 25,368–79,256 107 64–201
No. hospitalized case-patients by age group, y 13,764 9,278–21,305 4.5 3.0–7.0
 0–4 2,768 1,866–4,285 13.0 8.8–20.2
 5–24 4,991 3,364–7,725 6.0 4.1–9.3
 25–49 3,440 2,319–5,324 3.2 2.2–5.0
 50–64 1,912 1,289–2,959 3.4 2.3–5.2
>65 654 441–1,012 1.7 1.1–2.6
Multiplier
 Hospitalized 2.7 1.7–4.5 – –
 Nonhospitalized 79 47–148 – –
  Through  May  12 33 23–49 – –
  After  May  12 84 50–163 – –
*United States Population Estimates, 2009. 
†Age distributions from line list and aggregate reports of laboratory-confirmed cases and hospitalizations to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention through July 23, 2009. Prevalence of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, United States
the model parameters to represent their local experience, 
which may provide useful estimates of the prevalence of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in their areas and help plan for 
a subsequent wave of the epidemic in the fall and winter 
months of 2009–2010.
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